We show that the credit quality of corporate debt issuers deteriorates during credit booms, and that this deterioration forecasts low excess returns to corporate bondholders. The key insight is that changes in the pricing of credit risk disproportionately affect the financing costs faced by low quality firms, so the debt issuance of low quality firms is particularly useful for forecasting bond returns. We show that a significant decline in issuer quality is a more reliable signal of credit market overheating than rapid aggregate credit growth. We use these findings to investigate the forces driving time-variation in expected corporate bond returns.
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I. Introduction
In most modern accounts of the credit cycle, fluctuations in the quantity of credit are driven by time-varying financing frictions, due to changes in borrowers' net worth or in bank capital (Bernanke and Gertler (1989) ; Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) ; Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) ;
and Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) ). Notably absent from these accounts is the possibility that time-varying investor beliefs or tastes play a role in determining the quantity and allocation of credit. This absence is surprising given abundant evidence of historical periods -such as the 1980s junk bond era or the credit boom of 2004-2007 -when credit markets appear to have become overheated, potentially reflecting heightened investor risk appetites or over-optimism.
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During these periods, investors granted credit at low promised yields to borrowers of poor quality, and experienced low returns when these borrowers later defaulted and credit spreads widened. In this paper we show that this pattern of deteriorating issuer quality followed by low investor returns should be understood as a recurring feature of the credit cycle.
Our approach is to link patterns of corporate debt financing to time-series variation in the pricing of credit risk. The key insight is that broad changes in the pricing of credit risk disproportionately affect the financing costs faced by low credit quality firms. To the extent that firms issue more debt when credit is "cheap," the debt issuance of low credit quality firms may then be a particularly useful barometer of financing conditions. Specifically, time-variation in debt issuer quality may be useful for forecasting corporate bond returns: following periods when debt issuers are of particularly poor credit quality credit assets should underperform.
To test this hypothesis, we form time-series measures of debt issuer quality. Our primary measure compares the average credit quality of firms with high debt issuance -proxied using each firm's expected default frequency -to the credit quality of firms with low debt issuance. A second measure is constructed from credit ratings: each year from 1926 to 2008, we compute the fraction of corporate bond issuance that is rated speculative grade. Building on Hickman (1958), Atkinson (1967) , and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) , we show that variation in issuer quality is a central feature of the credit cycle: when aggregate credit increases, the average quality of issuers deteriorates.
We use these measures of issuer quality to forecast the excess returns on corporate bonds.
Following periods when issuer quality is poor, corporate bonds significantly underperform Treasury bonds of similar maturities. The degree of return predictability is large in both economic and statistical terms. The predictability is most striking for high yield bonds -with univariate R 2 statistics up to 30% at a 3-year horizon -but similar results obtain for investment grade bonds, albeit with diminished magnitude. We show that issuer quality has incremental forecasting power for corporate bond returns over and above traditional proxies for risk premia, including credit spreads, short-term interest rates, and the term spread. Furthermore, the quality of debt issuance is a better forecaster of excess corporate bond returns than the aggregate quantity of debt issuance, suggesting that the quantity of debt issuance responds to common shocks which are unrelated to the pricing of credit risk (e.g., common shocks to investment opportunities). In summary, our results demonstrate a high degree of predictability in corporate bond returns that is linked to the quality of corporate debt financing.
We then use these findings to shed light on the forces that drive time-series variation in expected corporate bond excess returns. We consider three potential sources of return predictability: (1) countercyclical variation in the rationally determined price of risk as would arise in consumption-based asset pricing models; (2) time-variation in intermediary risk tolerance in markets characterized by limited capital or other intermediary financing frictions;
and (3) time-varying mispricing due to investor biases in evaluating credit risk over the cycle. In attempting to discriminate between these sources, we recognize that it is generally impossible to fully rule out one explanation or another. This is because theories of time-variation in expected returns are quite flexible and there is little reason to believe that just one channel is operational.
We first consider whether the results are consistent with consumption-based models in which markets are integrated and the rationally determined price of risk varies in a countercyclical fashion. For instance, investors' risk aversion may vary due to habit formation as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) . According to these explanations, investors are not systematically surprised when the bonds of low quality firms who often receive funding during booms later underperform.
Our measures of issuer quality are correlated with fluctuations in the business cycle, suggesting some promise for consumption-based asset pricing models. And, when included as controls in our return forecasting regressions, current and lagged macroeconomic conditions slightly attenuate the effects of issuer quality. However, a major stumbling block for these models is that we forecast significantly negative excess returns in a number of sample years.
Because credit assets typically underperform Treasuries during bad economic times, rational consumption-based models would always predict positive expected excess returns. Furthermore, our quality measures are disconnected from traditional forecasters of the equity premium, and do not forecast excess stock returns, cutting against the idea that issuer quality proxies for a rationally time-varying price of risk in fully integrated stock and bond markets.
Another source of variation in expected returns could stem from changes in intermediary risk tolerance in markets characterized by limited capital. For example, a number of authors have argued that fluctuations in intermediary equity capital may be tied to risk premia. We examine a number of proxies for intermediary balance sheet strength, including lagged intermediary capital ratios and balance sheet growth. Several of these measures are correlated with issuer quality in the expected direction (e.g., issuer quality tends to be poor when insurers -who are large holders of corporate bonds -have high equity capital ratios). However, the forecasting power of issuer quality is not impacted by the addition of intermediary-related controls.
A slightly different intermediary-based explanation is suggested by Rajan (2005) , who
argues that agency problems may encourage delegated investors to "reach for yield," buying riskier assets with high promised yields when riskless interest rates are low. Consistent with this idea, we show that issuer quality declines when yields on Treasury bonds are low or have recently fallen. On the other hand, interest rate controls do little to affect the forecasting power of issuer quality in our regressions.
A third source of variation in expected returns could come from biased investor beliefs.
Specifically, investors may make biased assessments of default probabilities, leading to time-varying mispricing of credit. A natural bias might stem from over-extrapolation of past default rates or bond returns. For example, following a string of years in which few firms default, investors may underestimate future default probabilities, leading them to bid up the prices of risky corporate bonds. As a result, investors are systematically surprised by periods of elevated corporate defaults, resulting in sharp declines in corporate bond prices.
Explanations that appeal investor over-extrapolation are attractive because they allow for negative expected excess returns, consistent with our findings. And, while it is difficult to measure investors' beliefs directly, the extrapolation story predicts that issuer quality should decline following periods of low defaults or high credit returns. This pattern emerges quite strongly in the data, suggesting that the recent experience of credit market investors may play a role in shaping investors' expectations or tastes.
In summary, it is not possible to fully pin down the forces that drive variation in expected returns. However, the evidence suggests that mispricing may play a role -i.e., investor "sentiment" may play a role in driving credit cycles. And, if we adopt this interpretation, a significant erosion in issuer quality may be a useful signal of credit market overheating.
The plan for the paper is as follows. Section II motivates our empirical strategy. Section III describes the data and the construction of our issuer quality measures, which we tie to historical accounts of the credit cycle. Section IV presents our main return forecasting results.
We also discuss the link between issuer quality and aggregate credit growth, affirming the central importance of issuer quality from the standpoint of credit cycles. Section V evaluates competing explanations for the predictable variation in excess returns that we document. Section VI concludes.
II. Empirical Design
Here we develop a simple reduced-form model in which corporate debt issuance responds to changes in the pricing of credit. The model explains why debt issuer quality may be useful for forecasting excess credit returns. The model pinpoints the circumstances under which quality is a better barometer of the credit market than the quantity of issuance; it also explains why quality may contain information about expected returns beyond what is revealed by credit spreads.
A. A reduced-form model of credit spreads and debt issuance
Following Duffie and Singleton (1999) , credit spreads (the difference between corporate bond yields and risk-free yields of the same maturity) are equal to expected credit losses plus expected excess returns. At this point we can be agnostic about what drives variation in expected returns: it might be a rationally time-varying credit risk premium, time-varying mispricing, or both. As a simple reduced form, we write the credit spread s ,t for firms of type θ as , ,
where θ,t is the time-varying probability of default, δ t denotes the time-varying expected return on credit assets, and β θ is the exposure of type θ firms to the market-wide pricing credit risk.
Thus, the expected excess return on bonds of type θ is
For simplicity, we assume that  θ,t does not directly affect expected excess returns. Since default probabilities  θ,t vary over time, equations (1) and (2) capture the idea that spreads mean different things at different times: spreads can be low because default probabilities are low or because expected excess returns are low.
For simplicity, suppose firms are either low default risk L or high default risk H, with  L,t <  H,t for all t. Our central assumption is that  L <  H . This means that the bonds of high default risk firms are more heavily exposed to market-wide changes in the pricing of credit risk.
Firms of type θ choose their debt issuance d ,t (or leverage) by trading off the benefits of issuing additional cheap debt against the costs of deviating from their target capital structure, as in Stein (1996) . Target capital structure has two independent components: a part  t that is common to all firms and a part  ,t that is specific to firms of type θ. A variety of factors unrelated to expected returns may cause target leverage to fluctuate, such as changes in investment opportunities. We assume that firms choose their issuance to solve
( / 2)( 
,
so firms borrow more when the expected returns on credit assets are low.
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A classical justification for this reduced-form appeals to familiar Q-theory logic: the optimal scale of corporate investment, and hence debt issuance, rises when rationally required returns decline.
The logic of our identification strategy can be seen immediately from equation (4 
A proxy for the issuer quality mix is the difference in debt issuance between high and low default risk firms
.
By looking at the quality of issuance, we remove the impact of the common factor  t which affects the issuance of all firms. Thus, the quality mix helps isolate the information that issuance contains about expected returns.
B. Forecasting returns using issuance quantity and quality
Under these assumptions, both quantity (
negatively forecast excess returns in a univariate regression. In a bivariate forecasting regression 2 The idea that firms can back out the component of credit spreads that is due to any time-varying mispricing may seem objectionable: it seems implausible that firms could have an informational advantage over sophisticated investors in forecasting broad changes in spreads. However, as emphasized by Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2010) , firms may have an institutional advantage in exploiting aggregate mispricing even if they have no informational advantage. Sophisticated investors are often subject to limits of arbitrage which may be particularly relevant in the case of market-wide mispricing. By contrast, operating firms can exploit this kind of mispricing by adjusting their capital structures without the fear of performance-based withdrawals.
that includes both quantity and quality, the coefficients on both variables will be negative so long 
D. Measuring issuer quality empirically
How should we measure issuer quality in the data? A first approach which follows directly from equation (6) To see the intuition, consider the related exercise of forecasting stock returns using equity issuance and the dividend yield, D/P. Suppose a Gordon growth model holds, so D/P reflects expected returns and dividend growth -i.e., D/P = R -G. If issuance responds mechanically to D/P, it will have no incremental forecasting power. If, however, issuance responds differentially to changes in R, it may contain additional information beyond D/P.
where we now allow quality β i and debt issuance vary continuously across firms. This construction parallels the equity issuance-based "characteristic spreads" used in Greenwood and Hanson (2011) . It is straightforward to show that all three measures are decreasing in expected returns δ t . While ISS t is the measure we emphasize in the majority of the paper, we show that our findings are not sensitive to the specific method we use to measure issuer quality.
III. Measuring Debt Issuer Quality
A. Compustat-based measures of issuer quality: 1962 Compustat-based measures of issuer quality: -2008 Following the above discussion, we compare the credit quality of firms issuing large amounts of debt to that of firms issuing little debt or who are retiring debt. Specifically, in each year t, we compute , , When substituting a firm's EDF into equation (8), we follow convention and use NYSE deciles rather than the raw values. Using deciles minimizes the influence of outlier firms and avoids the possibility of picking up compositional shifts in the set of listed firms or secular trends.
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It also makes the units easy to interpret: 1
EDF t ISS
 means that firms with high net debt issuance had EDFs that were on average one decile higher than firms with low net debt issuance.
We plot ISS EDF in Figure 1 and provide summary statistics for the time series in Table 1 .
ISS EDF
was high (i.e., high debt issuers were of relatively poor quality) in the mid-to -late 1960s, 1973, 1978, the mid-to-late 1980s, 1997-1998, and again in 2005-2007 . ISS EDF drops sharply in 1970-1971, 1975-1976, the early 1990s, 2001-2002, and 1968-1969 and 1970-1971 .
The decline of issuer quality during the 1980s junk bond boom has been noted by a number of authors (Grant (1992) and Kaplan and Stein (1993) (Asquith, Mullins, and Wolff (1989) 
where B i,t denotes the principal value of bond i issued in year t.
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In our forecasting regressions, we take the log of the raw share so that our regression coefficients can be interpreted as the change in returns following a one percent change in HYS. is not be impacted by secular shifts in the 6 High yield bonds are those rated Ba1 or lower by Moody's or BB+ or lower by SS&P. For simplicity, we use the S&P nomenclature (e.g., AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, and C) throughout, even when working with Moody's data. 7 We use log(HYS) because it provides a good fit, but qualitatively similar results obtain if we forecast returns using HYS. To compute log(HYS), we need to address the fact that HYS = 0 in 1974. To do so, we set HYS equal to 0.0024 for 1974 before applying the log transformation (0.0024 is the second lowest value of HYS observed in sample). However, our treatment of this single observation does not play an important role in driving our results. 8 FISD is the current incarnation of the Moody's Bond Survey, so we are using the same primary source throughout. We start using FISD in 1983 because FISD only contains bonds that mature in 1990 or later. So long as speculative and investment grades issues have similar maturity distributions, this truncation should impart no bias to HYS. We exclude financials, asset-backed securities, sovereigns, and exchange offers to preserve comparability with Hickman (1960) and Atkinson (1967) . The amount of bond offerings by Moody's rating from 1926-1943 is from contrast, relies on the assumption that the meaning of credit ratings has remained constant.
However, Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay (1998) and Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo (2010) argue that the agencies have become more conservative in assigning ratings since the late 1970s.
Fourth, ISS EDF
is based on net rather than gross debt issuance, thus better capturing changes in the financial position of low quality firms. Figure 2 illustrates a final limitation of HYS as a measure of issuer quality: it can be unduly volatile in years in which total issuance (the denominator in equation (9)) is particularly low. This is most problematic in 1933 -the historical low point for total issuance, representing a near collapse of the corporate bond market. Because investment grade issuance fell even more dramatically than high yield issuance in 1933, HYS spikes to its sample maximum at the nadir of the Great Depression. While we use the full time-series of HYS in the analysis that follows, we note that removing this single outlier significantly strengthens our forecasting results. 9 We can compute bonds outstanding as a share of total loans and bonds for non-financial corporations from Table 102 of the Flow of Funds. This "bond share" fell steadily from 52% in 1962 to 39% in 1984 and then gradually rose again to 61% by 2003. This trend reversed from 2004-2008 as the bond share again fell to 56%, reflecting the rapid growth of the leveraged loan market. 10 To see why, suppose that lending standards are relaxed, while bond investment standards remain unchanged. Since corporations substitute between loans and bonds (see e.g., Becker and Ivashina (2010) ), banks' willingness to grant cheap credit would raise loan issuance, lower bond issuance, and lower expected bond excess returns. However, total debt issuance would rise. In summary, assuming partial substitutability between bonds and loans, total debt issuance is likely to be better reflection of broad credit supply, which in turn drives expected excess bond returns. Empirically, it appears that ISS EDF partially reflects changes in lending standards: changes in ISS EDF are -0.51 correlated with the Federal Reserve's Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey of changes in the stricture of bank lending standards from 1967 -1983 (see Lown and Morgan (2006 ) and 1990-2008. We compute 2-and 3-year cumulative log excess returns by summing 1-year log excess returns.
C. Returns and other data
IV. Issuer quality and excess corporate bond returns
A. Univariate forecasting regressions
Figure 3 shows our main result. We plot ISS EDF against cumulative high yield excess returns over the following 2 years. Returns are plotted in reverse scale, so the negative 11 Ibbotson bond return data are also used by Keim and Stambaugh (1986) , Fama and French (1989) and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) . Ibbotson returns are based on a sample of corporate bonds with a remaining maturity greater than one year. The Barclays Capital U.S. High Yield Index covers the universe of U.S. dollar high yield corporate debt. Index-eligible issues must be fixed-rate, non-convertible, have a remaining maturity of at least one year, and have an outstanding par value of at least $150 million. The value-weighted index return includes the price return that is realized upon the event of default.
correlation appears positive visually. The correlation between the two series is -0.51. Simply put, periods of poor issuer quality are followed by low excess returns on corporate bonds. As we lengthen the forecast horizon from 1-year to 3-years, the R 2 grows to 29% and the coefficients increase in magnitude. Specifically, the coefficient on ISS EDF is -9.534 at a 1-year horizon, -15.254 at a 2-year horizon, and -17.301 at a 3-year horizon. In untabulated results, we extend this analysis to longer horizons, estimating (10) for horizons up to six years. The forecasting power is concentrated in the first two years, with some additional power at three years, after which it levels off.
Moving down Table 2 , the coefficients in Panel A for high yield bonds can be compared to those for BBB-rated and AAA-rated bonds in Panels B and C. The coefficient on ISS EDF declines in magnitude from -9.534 when forecasting 1-year high yield returns, to -5.311 when forecasting BBB returns, and -2.278 when forecasting AAA returns. This pattern of coefficients, 12 As can be seen in Figure 3 , high levels of ISS EDF predict low or negative high yield excess returns. Conversely, low levels of ISSEDF predict large positive excess returns. Furthermore, the impact of high and low values of ISS EDF is roughly symmetric. Let max , 0 and min , 0 . If we estimate • • , we obtain b + = -12.786 (t = -2.30) and b₋ = -17.008 (t = -3.24). However, the difference between b + and b₋ is not significant. apparent throughout Table 2 , is consistent with the model in Section II in which lower-rated bonds have greater exposure to a common credit-related factor. Moving to the right, Table 2 shows that the forecasting power of ISS The right half of Table 2 shows specifications involving log(HYS) as the predictor.
Starting with the full 1926-2008 sample, the coefficient of -1.517 for 1-year returns implies that a one percent increase in HYS reduces high yield excess returns by -1.517%. In the subsample, the corresponding coefficient is -11.483, so the relation between HYS and subsequent returns is economically and statistically stronger than the full sample. More generally, because HYS was formed by splicing together four separate time-series, we estimate the forecasting Overall, a consistent picture emerges whether we forecast returns using ISS EDF or HYS and when we consider earlier or more recent subsamples.
B. Multivariate forecasting regressions
We now examine the incremental forecasting power of issuer quality over other potential predictors of excess corporate bond returns. Two sets of control variables are of interest. First, we want to know whether issuer quality has any forecasting power beyond common proxies for ex ante risk premia such as the term spread (Fama and French (1989) ) or the T-bill yield (Fama and Schwert (1977) ). Second, we want to understand to what extent the results in Table 2 are driven by firms responding to some degree of mean reversion in credit spreads or excess returns.
If issuer quality were driven out by credit spreads, our findings might still be interesting from an economic perspective, but would be less useful for forecasting returns.
Is it reasonable to think that issuance could contain incremental information about returns that is not contained in other observables such as credit spreads? If managers respond naively to changes in credit spreads, then the answer is no. However, as suggested in Section II, spreads mean different things at different times: they may be wide because expected credit losses are high, or because expected returns are high. If managers issue more when they perceive credit as being "cheap" (i.e., expected returns are low), then issuance may contain information beyond spreads. The same logic can be extended to other observable variables. If credit valuations are multi-dimensional, then corporate issuance decisions may integrate these disparate factors into a single statistic that is informative about returns. If we could condition on all relevant observables, issuance might become redundant in a forecasting regression. In practice, it may be difficult for the econometrician to identify the full set of relevant conditioning variables. Table 3 shows return forecasting regressions of the form , , ,
where X again denotes ISS EDF or log(HYS). As before, we forecast 1-, 2-and 3-year cumulative excess returns on high yield bonds. Controlling for the term spread and the T-bill yield has little impact on the coefficient on ISS
EDF
. For example, in the univariate forecasting regression in Table 2 , the slope coefficient on ISS EDF is -9.534, and falls in magnitude to -7.636 when these controls are added. The effects of the control variables are even more modest at 2-and 3-year forecast horizons. In the case of HYS for the full-1926-2008 sample, the coefficient on log(HYS) in the multivariate regressions actually larger in magnitude and more significant, than in the corresponding univariate regressions. In the 1983-2008 subsample, controlling for the credit spread and past high yield returns has a larger impact on the log(HYS) coefficient at a 1-year horizon. However, once we extend the forecast horizon to 2-and 3-years, these controls have little impact on the estimates and log(HYS) remains statistically significant.
C. The quantity and quality of debt issuance over the credit cycle
In this subsection, we discuss the relationship between aggregate credit growth, the quality of debt issuance, and excess corporate bond returns. There is no mechanical relationship between the quality of debt issuance and aggregate credit growth, yet it is natural to think the two would be positively correlated, and indeed such a relationship is predicted by our discussion in Section II. We show that while aggregate credit growth forecasts bond returns, focusing on the credit growth of low quality firms is even more powerful. Reminiscent of Hickman (1958), Atkinson (1967) , and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) , this exercise suggests that variation in credit quality is a defining feature of the credit cycle.
We start by documenting the correlation between quantity and quality. Figure 4 shows the strong correlation between issuer quality and aggregate credit growth. A number of previous studies use corporate securities issuance to forecast returns (e.g., Loughran and Ritter (1995) ).
14 It is natural to ask whether there is anything special about issuer quality per se -i.e., is there information in who is borrowing over and above the total quantity of borrowing? In Table 4 , we compare the forecasting power of issuer quality with that of aggregate credit growth. As argued in Section II, if debt issuance is partially driven by time variation in expected excess returns, the quantity and quality of debt issuance should both negatively forecast returns. However, if uninformative common shocks affect the issuance of all firms, we might expect issuer quality to outperform aggregate credit growth in a horserace. Baker and Wurgler (2000) and Greenwood and Hanson (2011) for equity market and equity-factor returns; and Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003) for excess government bond returns.
In a related exercise, columns (4) to (8) We next add a number of additional control variables to our baseline forecasting regression. We first consider a variety of business-cycle controls. The most extreme of these tests is to include both lagged and future business cycle controls. ISS EDF still retains its forecasting power, suggesting that its power does not derive -at least not exclusively -from its ability to predict future GDP or macro conditions.
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We also include the 8 principal components that
Ludvigson and Ng (2010) extract from 130 macro variables. This has little impact on our results.
We next add several forecasting variables studied in the recent literature. Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) find that the consumption wealth ratio (cay) predicts stock market returns.
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) show that a tent-shaped linear combination of forward interest rates forecasts the excess returns of long-term riskless bonds over short-term bonds. However, adding either variable as a control has almost no impact on the estimated coefficient on ISS EDF .
We then make various adjustments to the construction ISS EDF in equation (8). Using the raw level of EDF rather than the EDF decile strengthens our basic result in both univariate and multivariate specifications. We then examine the role of long-term versus short-term debt issuance (we follow Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003) in the computation of long-term and short-term debt issuance). These results suggest that the quality mix of long-term debt issuers is quite informative about returns, while the quality mix of short-term issuers is less so. This is to be expected given that major short-term debt issuers are almost always of exceptionally high credit quality. As mentioned above, we also obtain similar results if we compute the value weighted average EDF decile amongst high and low debt issuers (weighting by assets or total debt issued), or if we exclude financial firms. In summary, our results do not appear to be sensitive to variable construction.
One might wonder whether our results are sensitive to how we measure firm credit quality, namely using a Merton-style expected default frequency. For instance, Shumway (2001) provides an empirical model of bankruptcy with higher predictive power than the Merton model.
In row (18), we use Shumway's bankruptcy predictor (as opposed to EDF) in equation (8) These controls do not meaningfully affect our results.
Last, our results are potentially subject to the econometric issues that arise in return forecasting regressions. In the Internet Appendix, we discuss these issues and conduct a number of time-series robustness checks. We consider alternate procedures for computing standard errors, including a moving-blocks bootstrap and parametric standard errors computed under the assumption that residuals follow an ARMA process. We also examine the possible impact of Stambaugh (1999) bias on our results. None of these adjustments alter our basic conclusions.
E. Forecasting changes in credit spreads and future defaults
Ideally, we would like to relate the initial quality of a cohort of bonds to holding period returns on that cohort. Such cohort-level information is not available, so we use the holding period return on bond indices composed of issues with a fixed credit rating. Excess returns on a portfolio of low grade bonds are a function of the initial spread, the subsequent change in spreads on non-defaulted bonds, and realized default and recovery rates: LGD  is the loss-given-default. Table 6 shows that high values of ISS EDF forecast both future increases in credit spreads as well as high 21 future default rates. Specifically, the left panel of 
V. Discussion
The previous section demonstrates that deteriorating debt issuer credit quality forecasts low excess returns on corporate bonds. This section evaluates potential explanations of the underlying variation in expected returns. We first consider explanations in which the quantity or rational price of risk varies over the credit cycle. Next, we discuss frictional explanations that emphasize shocks to intermediary capital or, alternately, time-varying agency problems. Finally, we examine explanations in which investor over-extrapolation plays a role.
A. Time variation in the quantity of risk
We first rule out explanations in which expected returns are mechanically linked to the composition of bonds in the high yield index. Specifically, the most natural arguments suggest that lower quality issuance should be associated with a larger quantity of risk, forecasting returns in the opposite direction of our findings. For instance, suppose the risk-premium on C-rated bonds is greater than that on B-rated bonds, which is greater than that on BB-rated bonds. This is what we might expect given that factor loadings on MKTRF are largest for the lowest quality issues. Thus, a shift towards lower quality issuance should increase -not lower -the expected return on the high yield index as the average loadings on priced risk factors rise.
More generally, since the correlation between high yield excess returns and MKTRF may be time-varying, one might wonder if our results can be explained by a conditional-CAPM (e.g., high levels of ISS EDF might signal low future loadings on stock market excess returns). However, we find that high values of ISS EDF are associated with higher, not lower, future loadings of rx HY on stock market excess returns.
B. Fluctuations in the rationally determined price of risk
We now consider explanations in which time-variation in required returns is due to changes in the rationally determined price of risk. Countercyclical fluctuations in the price of risk arise in many consumption-based asset pricing models, such as those featuring habit formation (Campbell and Cochrane (1999)), time-varying consumption volatility (Bansal and Yaron (2004)), or time-varying consumption disaster risk (Barro (2006) and Gabaix (2010)).
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Under such explanations, a decline in investors' required returns during booms leads to a decline in issuer quality because changes in the price of risk have a greater impact on the investment (and hence debt issuance) decisions of low quality firms.
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Under such explanations, investors are not systematically surprised when the bonds of low quality firms who receive funding during booms later underperform.
Several of our findings are consistent with the idea that the rationally determined price of risk moves in a countercyclical fashion. Specifically, issuer quality has a clear business cycle component. In addition, adding macroeconomic controls often increases the R 2 in our forecasting regressions, while slightly reducing the magnitude of the coefficient on ISS EDF . Our forecasting results are also strongest for lower-rated bonds, consistent with the idea that lower-rated bonds may be more highly exposed to consumption risk.
However, many of our findings are difficult to square with rational integrated-markets explanations. First, as previously shown in Second, we show that our measures of issuer quality forecast significantly negative excess returns on high yield bonds in a number of sample years. While consumption-based models with a rationally time-varying price of risk can explain periods in which high yield bonds command a larger or smaller risk premium, they would not generate negative risk premia. More formally, so long as the covariance of the stochastic discount factor with excess credit returns is negative -i.e., so long as credit assets are expected to underperform Treasuries during bad times, then consumption-based models would always generate positive expected excess returns for high yield bonds. This approach to testing asset pricing models avoids the joint hypothesis problem noted by Fama (1970) and has been used by Fama and Schwert (1977) , Fama and French (1988) , Kothari and Shanken (1997) , and Baker and Wurgler (2000) .
Specifically, each year we forecast k-period cumulative excess returns, compute the standard error of the fitted value, and count the number of years in which expected returns are negative with 95% confidence. ISS EDF has forecast significantly negative 3-year cumulative excess returns in 14 years since 1962, and all but one of these years was actually followed by negative excess returns. ISS EDF has also forecast significantly negative excess returns at a 1-year and 2-year horizon in 7 and 14 sample years, respectively. We also find that ISS EDF forecasts significantly negative excess returns on BBB bonds over 1-and 2-year horizons on five occasions, four of which were followed by negative excess returns.
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We can also estimate nonlinear forecasting models which nest the null that expected returns are always non-negative, enabling us to directly test this constraint. These tests are discussed in the Internet Appendix and indicate that the null of non-negative expected returns is strongly rejected by the data.
Third, the magnitude of the predictability we document is difficult to square with frictionless stories in which the price of risk varies over time. As discussed in Campbell and Thompson (2008) and Welch and Goyal (2008) , it is useful to examine the out-of-sample 20 We obtain similar results if we include higher powers of ISS EDF or if we include additional time-series controls. Another concern is that the average excess return of high yield bonds is fairly low in our sample. We can deal with this concern by setting a lower threshold. For instance, there are 12, 7, and 5 years in which the fitted 2-year excess return is significantly less than -1%, -2%, and -3%, respectively. Alternately, we can work with simple excess returns, raising the average due to Jensen's inequality. Specifically, the average log excess return is 0.45% versus an average simple excess return of 1.15%. However, if we work with simple excess returns, we predict significantly negative excess returns in almost the exact same number of years.
forecasting power of a return predictor. Specifically, we compute out-of-sample R 2 using 2 2 2 1 1
where ˆt rx is the fitted value from the forecasting regression estimated through time t-1 and t rx is the average excess return estimated through t-1.
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We find large out-of-sample R It is difficult to square the magnitude of such predictability with fully-rational stories, even ones with meaningful fluctuations in the price of risk.
Fourth, we showed in Table 5 (2008) obtain out-of-sample R 2 statistics that are generally less than 5% and never exceed 8%.
C. Frictional explanations linked to intermediary balance sheets
We next consider frictional explanations in which risk premia fluctuate due to the health of financial intermediary balance sheets. A growing literature argues that fluctuations in intermediary equity capital or balance sheet health impact risk premia. Interpreting this literature broadly, the mechanism is one in which intermediaries become more risk averse following shocks to their capital, which is only rebuilt gradually due to various frictions.
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These theories predict that ISS EDF will be high when intermediary balance sheets are strong. Additionally, since intermediary capital is the driver of risk premia, these theories suggest that the coefficient on
ISS EDF
should be attenuated once we control for intermediary balance sheet strength. 
We estimate (13) with and without the full suite of controls. These regressions are shown in the first two columns of 
where Z t denotes balance sheet variables for different intermediary groups, including equity-toasset ratios (E/A) and annual asset growth (dA/A), are constructed from Flow of Funds data following Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010) .
Which intermediaries are relevant in the present context? We first consider insurers, which are the single largest group of corporate bond holders according to Flow of Funds data. As shown in the first two columns of Table 10 , ISS EDF tends to be high (i.e., issuer quality is low)
when insurer equity-to-asset ratios are high as would be predicted by these theories. However, the remaining columns show that including measures of insurer balance sheet strength does not alter our forecasting results -neither the coefficient on ISS EDF nor its statistical significance is much changed by the additional controls.
We next consider broker-dealer balance sheets. While securities brokers are not major holders of corporate bonds, they serve as underwriters and provide liquidity in the over-thecounter secondary market for corporate bonds. Furthermore, Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010) find that broker balance sheets contain useful information about a variety of risk premia.
However, we do not find a strong relationship between broker-dealer balance sheets and ISS EDF .
Last, we consider three sets of proxies for the health of bank balance sheets: balance sheet variables (E/A and dA/A), lagged bank stock returns, and bank loan loss provisions. Again, banks are not large holders of corporate bonds, but they are the main providers of corporate loans -the key substitute for bonds from firms' perspective. If a shortage of bank capital raises the returns banks require on loans, firms should substitute from loans to bonds until the expected returns on bonds and loans are equated. Thus, we might expect a negative shock to bank capital to raise the required returns on corporate bonds. We also note that these explanations do not allow for negative expected excess returns, contrary to our findings.
D. An agency-based explanation: "Reaching for yield"
An alternate intermediary-related explanation is that time-varying risk premia are not driven by institutions' ability to take risk, but rather by their willingness to take risk due to agency problems. Rajan (2005) The fact that issuer quality beats proxies for intermediary balance sheet strength in a horserace does not mean that fluctuations in intermediary risk tolerance are unimportant. As discussed above, issuer quality is an equilibrium outcome that may function as a sufficient statistic for a number of primitive forces, including the health of intermediary balance sheets, which drive risk premia in credit markets. And, if a large number of primitive factors drive risk premia, we might expect issuer quality to win head-tohead horseraces against proxies for each of those individual factors. have pointed to the low level of nominal rates as a key driver of the surge in high yield issuance in 2010. Similarly, Klarman (1991) argues that one impetus to the 1980s junk bond boom was from investors eager to earn the same high nominal returns they had earned in the early 1980s.
There are numerous forces encouraging intermediaries to reach for yield. A first is that low interest rates make intermediaries with fixed liabilities -such as life insurers -willing to take on more asset risk. When interest rates are high these intermediaries can meet fixed obligations without taking on significant risk. By contrast, low interest rates create the equivalent of a debt overhang problem and lead managers to engage in risk-shifting (Jensen and Meckling (1976)), accepting greater risk in exchange for lower expected returns. A second force stems from the incentives facing investment managers who are compensated based on nominal absolute returns, which may also encourage risk-shifting when interest rates are low. These agency-based explanations do not require mistaken beliefs on the part of investment managers, who are assumed to respond optimally to incentives. Furthermore, these explanations are also potentially consistent with negative expected returns.
Further evidence on the reaching for yield hypothesis is shown in Table 8 
We also run this regression in changes
where Δ k denotes the k-year difference and . However, reaching for yield appears unlikely to be the whole story, since, as shown in Table 3 , interest rate controls do not affect our basic forecasting regressions.
To summarize, both consumption-based explanations that emphasize rationally time-varying discount rates, as well as frictional explanations that are based on limited intermediary capital or agency problems have some ability to explain certain aspects of our findings.
However, the forecasting power of issuer quality is robust to a variety of controls suggested by these theories. Given this, it is tempting to simply attribute the residual to some unspecified form of mispricing. Below, we take a different route, articulating one a specific account of mispricing that relies on over-extrapolation.
E. Investor over-extrapolation and mispricing
Finally, we consider explanations in which biased investor beliefs generate predictable variation in excess corporate bond returns. A natural story is that investors over-extrapolate past defaults or past volatility realizations, leading to time-varying mispricing of corporate bonds. For instance, following a period of low defaults, investors may begin to believe that low credit quality firms are safer than they truly are, leading them to bid up the prices of risky debt.
Recognizing that credit is cheap, low quality firms would then issue large amounts of debt, making them even more likely to default in the future. As a result, issuer quality would negatively forecast excess corporate bond returns.
While extrapolative expectations deviate from the rational ideal, they may not be unrealistic. Researchers have shown that subjects are prone to over-extrapolation in a wide variety of settings. Specifically, subjects often use a "representativeness" heuristic, drawing strong conclusions from small samples of data (Tversky and Kahneman (1974) ). We also note that many intermediaries use backward-looking risk management systems such as Value-at-Risk when extending credit. These systems may result in over-extrapolation, leading financial institutions to under-estimate future risks following periods of low volatility or low credit losses.
A more formal account of over-extrapolation in credit markets might go as follows. (The details of such a model are provided in the Internet Appendix.) Suppose the economy exogenously switches between good times in which few firms default, and bad times in which a higher fraction of firms default. However, following Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) , investors think that the economy either evolves according to a more or less persistent process.
Following a string of low-default realizations, investors start to believe that the process governing defaults is more persistent than it truly is, leading them to under-estimate future default probabilities and bid up the price of risky corporate debt. These expectations will be revised after a period of high corporate defaults, resulting in a sharp decline in bond prices. If these bad times persist for long enough, investors will begin to over-estimate future default probabilities. According to this interpretation, credit market "sentiment" is favorable (unfavorable) when investors are underestimating (overestimating) future default probabilities.
These dynamics generate short-term return continuation and longer-term return reversals for corporate bonds.
To understand why the quality of corporate debt issuance might contain information about future bond returns, consider how firms would behave in this environment. Low quality firms would respond by issuing overpriced debt during booms, raising their leverage. Although investors know that leverage impacts default probabilities, their growing belief that good times are likely to persist leads them to underestimate the impact of rising leverage on default probabilities. Following a string of low aggregate defaults, investors become willing to lend to more highly levered firms for a given spread. Thus, a lower level of issuer quality is associated with greater over-optimism about future default rates and lower expected returns.
There are two reasons to take seriously an explanation in which investors make expectational errors. First, it is consistent with the finding that expected excess returns may sometimes be negative. Second, a distinguishing prediction is that issuer quality should be low following a string of low realized defaults. The results in Table 8 bear this out. Specifically,
ISS EDF
is high (i.e., issuer quality is low) following periods when default rates have been low and high yield excess returns have been high. These patterns are particularly pronounced when analyzed in changes: past defaults and returns explain 65% of the 2-year changes in ISS EDF .
Furthermore, these results continue to hold even if we control for recent macroeconomic conditions or recent stock returns. Thus, Table 8 suggests that the recent experience of credit market investors may play an important role in shaping their current expectations.
Consistent with the idea that the extrapolation of past performance can explain much of the time-variation in issuer quality, we obtain similar return forecasting results if we instrument for ISS EDF using past high yield default rates. Specifically, estimating 
VI. Conclusions
In the wake of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, a number of authors have argued that credit booms and busts can have important consequences for real economic activity (e.g., Ivashina and
Scharfstein (2009) and Blinder (2010)). Since debt comprises the vast majority of external corporate finance, it is surprising that little effort has been devoted to connect these booms and busts to investor beliefs or tastes. For example, a large literature in corporate finance and macroeconomics identifies reasons why the quantity of credit may fluctuate over the business cycle, but makes little attempt to connect these changes to investor returns.
Our main contribution is to construct a comprehensive measure of issuer quality and to use this measure to forecast excess corporate bond returns. When issuer quality is low, corporate bonds subsequently underperform Treasuries. We uncover a striking degree of predictability and often forecast significantly negative excess returns. These results are difficult to fully explain using rationally time-varying risk aversion or other drivers of countercyclical risk premia.
Instead, the findings suggest that it is worthwhile to consider explanations in which intermediary frictions drive variation in required returns, or explanations in which investors may systematically err in assessing credit quality at different stages of the credit cycle.
The results in this paper have implications for the ongoing debate about whether central banks should lean against incipient credit booms. For instance, the Basel Commmitee (2010) has proposed varying bank capital buffers over the cycle to protect the banking sector against periods of "excess aggregate credit growth." A major challenge for any policy of this sort is identifying the existence of a credit boom in the first place. Our results suggest that looking at credit quantities alone may not be enough -we may also want to consider the credit quality of debt market financing. 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics
Mean, median, standard deviation, and extreme values of firm characteristics (Panel A) and time-series variables (Panels B-E). Panel A summarizes the firm-level characteristics, with the exact details of their construction given in the Internet Appendix. Net debt issuance is the change in assets minus the change in book equity, scaled by by lagged assets. Net equity issuance is the growth of balance sheet equity, net of retained earnings, scaled by lagged assets. External finance is the sum of net debt and net equity issuance. EDF is the Merton (1974) expected default frequency, calculated following Bharath and Shumway (2008) . SHUM is the bankruptcy hazard rate as estimated by Shumway (2001) . Interest coverage is EBITDA divided by annual interest expense. Leverage is book debt over assets. Age is the number of years on CRSP. Dividends is annual cash dividend scaled by assets. For each characteristic X, ISS X compares the average characteristic decile of high and low quintile debt issuers in that year, where quintiles are based on NYSE breakpoints. These time-series are summarized in Panel B. Characteristics include EDF, SHUM, interest coverage, leverage, idiosyncratic volatility, size, age, and dividend policy. "High" and "Low" are defined such that high is associated with a higher default probabilities. Panel C summarizes the high yield share HYS, which is the dollar fraction of non-financial debt issues receive a high yield rating, according to Moody's. From 1983 -2008 , HYS is based on data from the Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). HYS from 1966-1982 is based on our assembly of bond issues from the Moody's Bond Surveys, HYS from 1944-1965 is based on Table B -1 of Atkinson (1967 ), and HYS from 1926 -1943 is based on Table 52 of Hickman (1960) . Panel D summarizes bond returns and the time-series control variables. y S the log yield on the short-term government bond. y GL -y GS is the spread between the yields on the intermediate-and short-term government bonds from Ibbotson, and y BBB -y GL is the BBB credit spread. Growth in industrial production, aggregate consumption growth, a recession dummy, the output gap, and Lettau and Ludvigson's (2001) consumption wealth ratio (cay) are macroeconomic control variables. Log excess returns on corporate bonds are computed for bond index returns based on high yield (HY), BBB-rated, and AAArated bonds, and are denoted rx. Excess stock returns (MKTRF), HML returns, and SMB are from Ken French. Panel E summarizes timeseries measures of intermediary balance sheet strength, including bank balance sheet capital (total assets minus liabilities all over assets) and bank balance sheet growth (percentage change in total assets); insurer balance sheet capital (total assets minus liabilities all over assets) and insurer balance sheet growth (percentage change in total assets); broker dealer balance sheet capital (total assets minus liabilities all over assets) and balance sheet growth (percentage change in total assets); lagged equal weighted returns on bank stocks based on Fama and French 48-industry classifications; and bank loan loss provisions scaled by total loans and leases from Table CB11 from the FDIC's Historical Statistics on Banking. Bank, Insurer, and Broker Dealer data are from the Flow of Funds accounts. Banks include commercial banks (Table L109) , saving institutions (L114) and credit unions (L115). Insurance companies include property and casualty (Table L116 ) and life (Table L117 ). Broker dealers are on HYS (FISD, 1983 (FISD, -2008 0.32 0.34 0.12 0.05 0.56 HYS (Moodys manuals & NBER, 1926 -1982 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.64 HYS (Spliced series, 1926 (Spliced series, -2008 0.18 0.14 0.15 0.00 0.64 
ISS EDF is the difference between the expected default frequency deciles of high and low net debt issuers in each year. The high yield (HYS) is the fraction of non-financial corporate bond issuance with a high yield rating from Moody's. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the cumulative 1-, 2-, or 3-year excess return on high yield bonds. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the cumulative 1-, 2-, or 3-year excess return on BBB-rated corporate bonds. In Panel C, the dependent variable is the cumulative 1-, 2-, or 3-year excess return on AAA-rated corporate bonds. Time-series forecasting regressions of log excess returns on speculative-grade bonds on measures of debt issuance quality, controlling for the term spread, short-rate, credit spread, and lagged excess returns: 
Table 5 Robustness
Robustness checks on the time-series forecasting regression from Tables 2 and 3   2 , , , , as well as the regression R 2 . The multivariate specifications include controls for the term spread, short-rate, credit spread, and lagged excess high yield returns. We adjustment the baseline regression in row (1) in a number of ways. Rows (2)- (5) present subsample results. In rows (6)-(11) we consider additional controls, including the output gap (Hodrick-Prescott filtered real GDP) in (6); other macroeconomic controls (industrial production, consumption growth, and a recession dummy) in (7); leads and lags of those macro controls in (8); the 8 macro factors from Ludvigson and Ng (2010) in (9); cay from Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) in (10) 
